DAVID O. CARTER, District Judge.
Before the Court is a Motion for Final Approval of Attorneys Fees, Costs, and Enhancement Fees (Dkt. 95) filed by Plaintiff J Paul Charlebois ("Plaintiff"). After considering the moving papers and oral argument, the Court GRANTS the Motion.
Plaintiff moves for fees under three statutes: (1) Section 12205 of Title 42 of the United States Code; (2) California Civil Code Section 55; and (3) California Civil Procedure Code Section 1021.5. Plaintiff qualifies as a party entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees under all three of these statutes.
Section 12205 of Title 42 of the United States Code provides that a court "may allow the prevailing party" to receive attorneys' fees and costs from defendants in cases brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. See 42 U.S.C. § 12205
The Ninth Circuit has held that an ADA plaintiff is a prevailing party if she: (1) "achieve[s] a material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties"; and (2) that alteration is "judicially sanctioned." Jankey v. Poop Deck, 537 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir.2008). The second requirement can be met in many ways, including when a party enters into a legally enforceable agreement with the defendant. Barrios v. California Interscholastic Fed'n, 277 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir.2002) (holding that plaintiff was "prevailing party" under 42 U.S.C. § 12205 because he could enforce a settlement against the defendant); Carbonell v. I.N.S., 429 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that Ninth Circuit "is in agreement with the vast majority of other circuits" that hold that "a litigant can `prevail' for the purposes of awarding attorney's fees as a result of judicial action other than a judgment on the merits or a consent decree").
The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff is the prevailing party based on the settlement he reached with Defendants.
California Civil Code Section 55 provides that a "prevailing party ... shall be entitled" to receive attorneys' fees and costs from defendants in cases brought under the California Disabled Persons Act ("CDPA"), Cal. Civ.Code § 54. See Cal. Civ.Code § 55
California Civil Procedure Code Section 1021.5 provides that "a court may
Courts have reversed as an abuse of discretion the denials of attorneys' fees under Section 1021.5 where the party seeking fees satisfied the statutory criteria. See e.g., Skaff v. Meridien N. Am. Beverly Hills, LLC, 506 F.3d 832, 835, 844 (9th Cir.2007) (reversing denial of attorneys' fees under Section 1021.5 in action to improve wheelchair users' access to hotel because statute's requirements were met by "court-enforceable settlement agreement" that "achieved [plaintiff's] objective of obtaining injunctive relief to make [defendant's hotel] accessible"); Hull v. Rossi, 13 Cal.App.4th 1763, 1765, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 457 (1993).
Each of the requirements of Section 1021.5 has been met in the instant case. First, this lawsuit has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest, namely, the right of wheelchair users to have affordable access to facilities. Second, there has been a significant benefit to a large class of persons because this lawsuit was successful in enforcing the civil rights of Plaintiff and the certified class of wheelchair users. See Estrada v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., 154 Cal.App.4th 1, 16-17, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 327 (2007) (plaintiff was entitled to attorneys' fees under Section 1021.5 where he "pursued this public interest class action not only for himself but on behalf of a class comprised of [defendant's] past and present drivers"). Third, because this action was for injunctive relief alone, no fees can be paid out of the recovery.
Finally, the necessity and financial burden requirement "seeks economic equalization of representation in cases where private enforcement is necessary." In re Conservatorship of Whitley, 50 Cal.4th at 1214, 117 Cal.Rptr.3d 342, 241 P.3d 840. This requirement asks the court to examine: (1) the "adequacy of public enforcement" (necessity prong); and (2) the financial disincentives and incentives of private action (financial burden prong). Id. As with most lawsuits brought under the CDPA to improve disabled people's access to facilities, the necessity prong is satisfied because the California legislature recognized the inadequacy of public enforcement when it provided for a private right of action and the recovery of attorneys' fees under Section 55. Donald v.
In sum, Plaintiff qualifies as a party entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees under all three of these statutes under which he moves for fees: (1) Section 12205 of Title 42 of the United States Code; (2) California Civil Code Section 55; and (3) California Civil Procedure Code Section 1021.5. Thus, the only dispute is whether the amount of fees sought is reasonable.
A "reasonable" fee is a fee that is "sufficient to induce a capable attorney to undertake the representation of a meritorious civil rights case." Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 130 S.Ct. 1662, 1672, 176 L.Ed.2d 494 (2010) (discussing analogous civil rights statute).
Under the Lodestar method, Plaintiff's attorneys are entitled to be compensated for "all hours reasonably spent on the matter." Serrano IV, supra, 32 Cal.3d at 635, 186 Cal.Rptr. 754, 652 P.2d 985; Sundance v. Municipal Court, 192 Cal.App.3d 268, 273-274, 237 Cal.Rptr. 269 (1987). The lodestar figure is presumed to represent an appropriate fee, but the Court may adjust the figure upward or downward to take into account special factors. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 897, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984); Jordan v. Multnomah County, 815 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir.1987). Adjustments to this presumptively reasonable amount may
Plaintiff seeks a total of $725,000 in attorneys' fees and costs, which is the maximum available under the parties' settlement agreement, as well as an $18,000 enhancement fee, which is within the range proscribed by the settlement agreement. See Reply at 24. The $725,000 figure is a reduction from the $1,165,448.08 to which Plaintiff argues that his attorneys ("Class Counsel") are entitled, that is, the sum of $1,118,280.56 in attorneys' fees and $47,167.52 in costs. See Reply at 24. The attorneys' fees are calculated by multiplying the $745,520.37 lodestar figure by a 1.5 multiplier. The $745,520.37 lodestar figure reflects a reduction from Plaintiffs original figure based on Plaintiffs acquiesce to Defendants' criticisms of some hours. See Feldman Decl. at ¶¶ 11-12; DeSimone Reply Decl. at ¶¶ 21-23. The following chart reflects how Plaintiff calculated Class Counsel's figures and also indicates the bar admission year, rates, total hours, and fees incurred by each biller involved in litigating this action:
Attorney/Legal Worker Bar Admittance: Rate: Hours: Fees: % of Fees: V. James DeSimone 1985 $695.00 401.20 $278,834.00 35% Michael D. Seplow 1990 $630.00 68.80 $43,344.00 5% Amanda Canning 2006 $450.00 724.30 $325,935.00 41% Eugene Feldman1 1985 $600.00 136.70 $82,020.00 10% Courtney Abrams 2009 $375.00 19.00 $7,125.00 1% Menaka Fernando 2010 5325.00 6.10 $1,982.50 0.25% David Sarnoff 2005 $460.00 15.50 $7,130.00 1% Paralegals n/a $150.00 337.55 $50,632.50 6% Law Student Interns n/a $200.00 480.00 N/A 0%Total Hours: Total Fees: 1709.15 $797,003.00 Internal Conference Time ("CT") Fees Pre-Mediation: $107,952.50 Internal CT Fees Post-Mediation: $14,755.00 Total CT Fees: $122,707.50 25% Billing Judgment Reduction: $30,676.88 Total CT Fees after 25% Billing Judgment Reduction: $92,030.63 Judgment Billing Reduction of 100% of Law Clerk Hours: $96,000.00 Total Complaint Time Fees: $40,981.50 50% Billing Judgment Reduction: $20,490.75 Total Complaint Time Fees after 50% Billing Judgment Reduction: $20,490.75 Total Reduction: $147,167.63 Total Percent Reduction: 18.47% Total Fees with Billing Judgment: $745,835.37
See DeSimone Reply Decl. Ex. K.
Both the United States Supreme Court and California Supreme Court have held that fee awards to public interest attorneys who do not charge their clients—such as Class Counsel—are "calculated according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant community, regardless of whether plaintiff is represented by private or nonprofit counsel." Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984); Folsom v. Butte County Ass'n of Govt's, 32 Cal.3d 668, 683-84, 186 Cal.Rptr. 589, 652 P.2d 437 (1982) (same). "The proper reference point in determining an appropriate fee award is the rates charged by private attorneys in the same legal market as prevailing counsel." Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 925 (9th Cir.1996); Blum, 465 U.S. at 895, fn. 11, 104 S.Ct. 1541 ("[R]ates charged in private representations may afford relevant comparisons.").
Plaintiff has established the reasonableness of Class Counsel's fee rates through the declarations by Class Counsel and three other attorneys who practice civil rights litigation in Southern California. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 896 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir.1990) ("Affidavits of the plaintiffs' attorney and other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community, and rate determination in other cases, particularly those setting a rate for the plaintiffs' attorney, are satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate."); Bouman v. Block, 940 F.2d 1211, 1235 (9th Cir.1991) (the submission of "declarations stating that the rate was the prevailing market rate in the relevant community [was] ... sufficient to establish the appropriate rate for lodestar purposes"). In addition, Plaintiff has established the reasonableness of Class Counsel's fee rates through comparison with other cases. See Nadarajah v. Holder, 569 F.3d 906, 917 (9th Cir.2009) (affirming award of attorneys' fees at rate of $500 per hour where party had submitted a declaration describing her experience and attached copies of fee awards in the same geographical area where counsel had comparable experience).
For example, Californians for Disability Rights v. Cal. DOT (Caltrans) is a case from 2010 in which the court awarded attorneys' fees in an action to improve accessibility for people with mobility disabilities. See No. C 06-05125 SBA (MEJ), 2010 WL 8746910, *1, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141030, *3 (N.D.Cal. Dec. 13, 2010). The court found reasonable $730/ hour for a 1985 graduate and $740/hour for a 1984 graduate, which is $35/hour greater than the rate requested by Mr. DeSimone, a 1985 graduate. Id. at *13, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141030 at *39. Similarly, the court found reasonable $660/hour and $650/hour for a 1991 and 1992 graduate respectively, while Mr. Seplow, a 1990 graduate, is only requesting $630/hour. Id. Likewise, an attorney with six years experience, the same number of years of practice as Ms. Canning, was awarded $500/hour, and a five year attorney was awarded $475. Id. By contrast, Ms. Canning is only requesting $450/hour. Given that the Caltrans rates were approved in 2010 and it is now 2012, Class Counsel's requested rates are below the high end of the market. See also Pereira v. Ralph's Grocery Co., CV 07-841 PA(FFMX), 2010 WL 6510346, *1, *7 (C.D.Cal. July 1, 2010) (awarding attorneys' fees under ADA and CDPA and finding reasonable fee rates of $700/hour in class action settlement); Elder v. Nat'l Conference of Bar Examiners, C 11-00199 SI, 2011 WL 4079623, *1, *4 n. 4 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 12, 2011) (awarding attorneys' fees under ADA and finding reasonable fee rates of $730/hour for a 1985 graduate, $640/hour for a 1993 graduate, $535/hour for a 2003 graduate).
Because Plaintiff established reasonableness of Class Counsel's fee rates, the burden shifts to Defendants to rebut
Plaintiffs Motion included three declarations from lawyers who practice in the Southern California region attesting to the reasonableness of Class Counsel's fee rates. All three declarations are from litigators in class action litigation and civil rights law with comparable experience to Class Counsel. However, Defendants argue that one of these attorneys, Carol Sobel, is not an appropriate comparator because she "specializes in First Amendment Rights and police litigation," which is a "completely different area of law" from the disability rights law "at issue in this case." Defendants argue, without authority, that such specialization renders Sobel inapposite because "the relevant market in this case is comprised of attorneys in Los Angeles or Orange County who specialize in disability rights cases under Titles II and 11 of the ADA." Opp'n at 11.
First, Defendants are incorrect as matter of law that the relevant market is limited only to attorneys who specialize in the specific disability rights laws at issue here. Defendants' unsubstantiated argument is contradicted by the Federal and California fee-shifting statutes at issue here, which "specifically offer[ ] statutory attorney fees as incentive to encourage attorneys to handle these important cases." Blackwell v. Foley, 724 F.Supp.2d 1068, 1077 (N.D.Cal.2010) (discussing ADA and CDPA); Donald v. Cafe Royale, Inc., 218 Cal.App.3d 168, 179, 266 Cal.Rptr. 804 (1990) ("[T]he [California] Legislature's
Alternatively, even if Defendants were correct that one of three declarations provides an inapt comparator, the Court can not reduce Class Counsel's fee rates because the other two declarations alone satisfy Plaintiffs burden to show the reasonableness of Class Counsel's fee rates. Defendants' opposition is entirely silent as to these other two declarations in support of Class Counsel's fees. Such silence is insufficient to meet Defendants' burden to rebut the reasonableness of these rates with specific evidence. See Gates, 987 F.2d at 1397-98.
In sum, the Court is not persuaded by Defendants' argument that Class Counsel's rate should be reduced simply because one of three comparators is not a disability rights specialist.
Defendants argue that the fee rates at some of the firms to which Class Counsel compares itself are inappropriate because these firms are "the most prestigious international law firms in the country," and thus have "the highest hourly rates," whereas Class Counsel work at a 12-attorney boutique. Opp'n at 11. Defendant submitted two declarations from attorneys at elite firms that aver that their fee rate is lower than some of the fee rates of Class Counsel. Defendants offer no authority to explain why the size of a firm or the firm's reputation renders comparisons to Class Counsel inappropriate.
Courts have rejected similar arguments under similar fee-shifting statutes. See e.g., Cruz ex rel. Cruz v. Alhambra Sch. Dist., 601 F.Supp.2d 1183, 1194-95 (C.D.Cal.2009) (rejecting defendant's argument "that it is inappropriate to determine rates for Plaintiffs' attorneys using data from large law firms because such firms generally do work in areas of federal litigation that garner higher rates than those charged for civil rights litigation"). The reasoning is two-fold. First, the Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit have expressly endorsed comparisons to "lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation" and have never required prevailing party's counsel to also prove that their firm is the same size or has the same level of prestige as that of comparator attorneys. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886,
Moreover, Class Counsel's firm reputation is prestigious and thus on par with its comparator firms. Class Counsel's firm is a major player in litigating cutting edge international human rights cases, as exemplified by law partner Paul Hoffman's February 2012 argument before the U.S. Supreme Court in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Case No. 10-1491. See DeSimone Reply Dec. at ¶ 19. One of the members of Class Counsel, DeSimone, has been named by the Daily Journal among the Top 50 Employment Lawyers in the State of California, inclusive of lawyers from top international law firms, for three years in a row. Id.
Alternatively, even if Defendants were correct that attorneys from some law firms were inapt comparators, the Court can not reduce Class Counsel's fee rates because the declarations from three civil rights attorneys alone satisfy Plaintiffs burden to show the reasonableness of Class Counsel's fee rates. As noted previously, Defendants' opposition is entirely silent as to two of these declarations. Such silence is insufficient to meet Defendants' burden to rebut the reasonableness of these rates with specific evidence. See Gates, 987 F.2d at 1397-98.
In sum, the Court is not persuaded by Defendants' argument that Class Counsel's rate should be reduced simply because some of the fee rates cited in support of Class Counsel's fees are from attorneys working at firms of a different size or reputation than Class Counsel's firm.
Defendants argue that this Court should reduce the fee rate of one member of Class Counsel, DeSimone, because one state court in a different case decided more than four years ago reduced DeSimone's fee rate. Defendants rely on Benham v. S & J Sec. & Investigation, in which a California Court of Appeals held that the "trial court did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in setting rates" of $425/hour rather than DeSimone's requested $600/hour because the "trial court explained that the rate determinations were based on the simplicity of the facts and the lower level of expertise required in this case." 2010 WL 761586, *12, 2010 Cal.App. Unpub. LEXIS 1616, *29, *33 (Cal.App.2d Dist. Mar. 8, 2010).
First, Defendants' argument to reduce fee rates to the rates awarded in cases prior to the action for which fees are sought fails as a matter of law because, as courts have recognized when rejecting identical arguments, such "cases do not
Alternatively, even if Defendants were correct that fee rates could be reduced to past rates, the Court can not reduce Class Counsel's fee rates because Defendants' evidence that one court reduced DeSimone's fee rate four years ago is insufficient to defeat DeSimone's evidence that other courts have awarded him higher fee rates.
Defendants argue that Class Counsel's fee rate should be reduced because Defendants' attorneys billed at lower rates than Class Counsel. Defendants' argument fails as a matter of law because Defendants' attorneys' hourly rate charged to clients is not the standard by which Class Counsel's fees are measured. See Trevino, supra, 99 F.3d at 925 (holding defense counsel's rates to be an improper starting point in determining plaintiff counsel's reasonable hourly rate). See also EEOC v. Harris Farms, Inc., 2006 WL 1028755, *19 (E.D.Cal. Mar. 1, 2006) (court declined to compare a plaintiff attorney's requested hourly rate to the hourly rate of a defense attorney). Non-contingent rates such as those charged by Defendants' attorneys do not account for the inherent risks associated with contingent work and delay in payment. See Welch v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 942, 946-47 (9th Cir.2007). Furthermore, Defendants' attorneys have not shown that their experience or reputation is comparable to that of Class Counsel.
In sum, the Court rejects as a matter of law all of Defendants' arguments to reduce Class Counsel's fee rates. Accordingly, the Court holds that Class Counsel's fee rates are reasonable.
The court "should defer to the winning lawyer's professional judgment as to how much time he was required to spend on the case." Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2008); Blackwell v. Foley, 724 F.Supp.2d 1068, 1081 (N.D.Cal.2010) ("An attorney's sworn testimony that, in fact, [she] took the time claimed ... is evidence of considerable weight on the issue of the time required."). To reduce the number of hours worked, "it must appear that the time claimed is obviously and convincingly excessive under the circumstances." Blackwell, 724 F.Supp.2d at 1081 (awarding attorneys fees under the same three statutes at issue here, Section 12205, Section 55, and Section 1201.5). This is true because "the purposes of the [fee-shifting] statutes will not be met" unless Plaintiffs attorneys are "reasonably compensated for all their time." Id.; Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1112 ("It must also be kept in mind that lawyers are not likely to spend unnecessary time on contingency fee cases in the hope of inflating their fees. The payoff is too uncertain, as to both the result and the amount of the fee.").
Plaintiffs moving papers and declarations show that Class Counsel efficiently staffed this matter by primarily assigning one associate to handle the bulk of the discovery and motion drafting with oversight by an experienced partner. See DeSimone Decl. at ¶ 54; Canning Decl. at ¶ 9. In addition, Class Counsel exercised billing judgment by reducing the total billing for conferences by 25% and not billing at all for the 480 hours worked by law clerks to account for any inefficiencies. See DeSimone Decl. at ¶ 54; Canning Decl. at ¶ 9; Ex. K DeSimone Reply Decl. at ¶ 22 (reduction of time on complaint), ¶ 23 (conference time reduction).
Because Plaintiff established reasonableness of Class Counsel's hours, the burden shifts to Defendants to rebut with evidence challenging the accuracy and reasonableness
Defendants argue that the hours worked by one member of Class Counsel, Feldman, should not be paid because he is not counsel of record and has "never made a single appearance in this case." Opp'n at 13. Defendants' argument fails as a matter of law because they cite no authority and precedent supports a contrary conclusion. In Invision Media Services, for example, the Ninth Circuit overturned the lower court and awarded fees to an attorney who had not made a formal appearance prior to the fee motion. Invision Media Servs. v. Glen J Lerner, 175 Fed. Appx. 904, 907 (9th Cir.2006). The court held that there was "no basis for requiring an attorney who actually contributed to the work product of another attorney" to be required to "enter appearances." Id.; see also Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Jones, CIV.A. 07-3599, 2009 WL 911011 (E.D.La. Mar. 31, 2009) (following Invision Media to award attorneys fees for work done by attorney "prior to formal enrollment as counsel"). Similarly, other courts have found that the hours of contract attorneys—who, like Feldman, are not counsel of record—nonetheless merit inclusion in the lodestar hours. See In re Tyco Int'l, Ltd. Multidistrict Litig., 535 F.Supp.2d 249, 272 (D.N.H.2007) (like paralegal time, it is "appropriate to bill a contract attorney's time at market rates and count these time charges toward the lodestar.").
Defendants argue that the hours worked on the complaint and on a summary judgment motion that was never filed are excessive and thus should be excluded from the lodestar figure.
Defendants argue that the 78 hours billed on the complaint are excessive because the complaint contained only 3 pages of facts and five causes of action. Defendant cites two cases which reduced the hours worked on the complaint: Johnson v. Curtis O. Barnes, PC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143286 (C.D.Cal. Dec. 13, 2010) and Cyr v. Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 2008 WL 7095148, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110336 (C.D.Cal. Jan. 16, 2008).
Plaintiff has reduced by half the hours devoted to researching and drafting the complaint. See Reply at 20 n. 14; DeSimone Reply Decl. Ex. K. Even if Plaintiff had not done so, the Court declines to follow Defendants' cases. Frankly, the Court suspects that several of the complaints it dismisses every week fail to state a claim because attorneys spend too little time researching the grounds for their
Defendants also argue that the hours worked on the summary judgment motion should be reduced because the motion was never filed. However, extensive authority supports awarding fees for time spent on unfiled motions. See Marbled Murrelet v. Pacific Lumber Co., 163 F.R.D. 308, 327 (N.D.Cal.1995) (rejecting defendant's argument that plaintiffs should not be awarded fees for time spent on a second amended complaint and possible motion for reconsideration, both of which were never filed, where the court found that it had no reason to doubt plaintiffs' representation that the work was reasonably related to the case at hand); ExperExchange, Inc. v. Doculex, Inc., No. C-08-03875 JCS, 2010 WL 1881484, *9 (N.D.Cal. May 10, 2010) (awarding party fees for time spent preparing a Daubert motion that was never filed and stating "[t]he fact that the motion was not, ultimately, filed, does not mean that the time spent preparing the motion was unreasonable."); Rux v. Starbucks Corp., 2007 WL 1098550, *3-4 (E.D.Cal. Apr. 12, 2007) (granting attorneys' fees for time spent drafting plaintiff's portion of a related joint statement regarding a discovery dispute which was ultimately not filed in light of defendant's last minute agreement to produce the requested deponent).
Furthermore, Defendants neglect to recognize that Defendants choose to negotiate a settlement days before the deadline for filing summary judgment motions; if Defendants had wished to not pay Class Counsel's fees, Defendants could have settled earlier. In addition, Plaintiff avers that it was only after Class Counsel met and conferred with Defense counsel on the motion for summary judgment that Defendants agreed to set a mediation date. Therefore, Class Counsel had no assurance that the matter would settle. Given the looming motion cut-off deadline, Class Counsel was diligent in representing the certified class by preparing a motion.
In sum, the Court is not persuaded by Defendants' argument to reduce the fees incurred in writing the complaint or summary judgment motion.
Defendants argue that the hours billed by one attorney reviewing another's work or on internal communications are duplicative and thus should be excluded from the lodestar figure. As the Court previously noted, this was a leanly-staffed case where more than 75% of the hours were billed by only two attorneys. Thus, the Court declines to reduce the hours simply because Class Counsel kept each other informed about the case and double-checked each other's work; indeed, many motions this Court denies would have benefitted from a second read and more strategizing by the attorneys involved.
In sum, the Court rejects all of Defendants' arguments to reduce Class Counsel's hours. Accordingly, the Court holds that Class Counsel's hours are reasonable.
Under the parties' settlement agreement, Class Counsel can not recover more than $725,000 in attorneys' fees and costs. Because the Court concludes that the lodestar figure of 745,520.37 in attorneys' fees and $47,167.52 in costs is reasonable, the Court need not consider additional arguments by Plaintiff to increase this figure by a multiplier.
In addition, the Court finds Plaintiffs enhancement award of $18,000 to be reasonable.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs motion. The Court AWARDS: (1) Class Counsel $725,000 in attorneys' fees and costs; and (2) Plaintiff $18,000 as an enhancement award.
